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As more and more nations prosecute copyright piracy cases, it is far from clear whether these
nations, in seeking to protect legitimate copyright interests, will also recognize the need to achieve
three goals in the sentencing of such cases. The first is honesty in sentencing: that is, avoiding
situations in which the nominal sentence that a court initially imposes at sentencing may later be
substantially reduced through the parole process. The second is reasonable uniformity in sentenc-
ing, so that courts do not have wide disparities in the sentences they impose on similar offenders
who commit similar criminal offenses. The third is proportionality in sentencing, so that courts
can impose suitably different sentences on offenders whose criminal conduct differs in severity.
This article compares the sentencing guidelines for copyright piracy in the United States and the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“HKSAR”). In this case, it would be inappropriate
to examine only the superficial similarities between the two jurisdictions’ sentencing practices for
copyright offenders. As this Article will show, there are substantial differences not only in the
types of guidelines that both jurisdictions have devised, but also in the means by which those
guidelines have been developed. This Article will therefore begin by summarizing the features of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that are most pertinent in sentencing criminal copyright offenders.
It will then examine the emergence of judicially devised sentencing guidelines in the HKSAR.
Finally, it will identify the more significant points of similarity and contrast between the two types
of guidelines, and evaluate the extent to which both types of guidelines achieve the fundamental
goals of honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR COPYRIGHT
PIRATES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Jonathan J. Rusch*
INTRODUCTION
Since 1996, when the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion ("WIPO") adopted the Copyright Treaty1 and the Perform-
ances and Phonograms Treaty,2 criminal prosecution has be-
come increasingly popular around the world as a means of com-
bating copyright piracy and vindicating the interests of copyright
holders. In a variety of criminal cases involving software and mu-
sic piracy, for example, courts in Australia,3 Egypt,4 Germany, 5
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR"),6 the
United Kingdom,7 and the United States8 have been meting out
sentences that include terms of imprisonment.
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and Special Coun-
sel for Fraud Prevention, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of justice. The views ex-
pressed herein are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of
any officer or component of the U.S. Department of Justice.
1. World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Copyright Treaty, No. CRNR/
DC/94, Dec. 20, 1996, available at http://www.wipo.org.
2. World Intellectual Property Organization, Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, No. CRNR/DC/95, Dec. 20, 1996, available at http://www.wipo.org.
3. See AAP, First Australian jail sentence for music piracy, THE AGE, Aug. 24,
2001, available at http://www.theage.com.au/entertainment/2001/08/24/FFXRKTH
FPQC.html (three-month term of imprisonment for record-shop owner who sold pi-
rated compact disks, records, and videos).
4. See Mats A. Palmgren, Software Pirates Sentenced in Alexandria, available at http://
www.pcworldegypt.com/archive/bsa.htm (five-month term of imprisonment, fine, and
confiscation of pirated software for computer resellers who sold pirated software).
5. See International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, Press Release, Jail
Sentence and Fine for Operator of W Europes Largest Covert Pirate CD Plant, July 10, 2002,
available at http://www.ifpi.org (one-year term of imprisonment (suspended for one
year) and 10,000 Euro fine for operator of underground pirate CD plant); Mary Lisbeth
D'Amico, German Court Gives Texan Software Pirate Jail Term, June 15, 1999, available at
http://www.idg.net (four-year term of imprisonment without probation for man deal-
ing in pirated software).
6. See, e.g., HKSAR v. Cheung Yip Shing, [2001] HKFCI 792 (2001) (dismissing
appeals against sentences of twelve-month and thirty-six-month terms of imprison-
ment).
7. See International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, Press Release, UK
Court jails importer of pirate CDs from Eastern Europe, Feb. 28, 2002, available at http://
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As more and more nations prosecute copyright piracy cases,
it is far from clear whether these nations, in seeking to protect
legitimate copyright interests, will also recognize the need to
achieve three goals in the sentencing of such cases. The first is
honesty in sentencing: that is, avoiding situations in which the
nominal sentence that a court initially imposes at sentencing
may later be substantially reduced through the parole process.
The second is reasonable uniformity in sentencing, so that
courts do not have wide disparities in the sentences they impose
on similar offenders who commit similar criminal offenses. The
third is proportionality in sentencing, so that courts can impose
suitably different sentences on offenders whose criminal con-
duct differs in severity.'
To achieve these goals, legal systems often develop some
form of sentencing guidelines that confine judicial discretion in
sentencing criminal offenders. The means by which those
guidelines are developed or promulgated can vary widely. Many
common-law jurisdictions continue to treat criminal copyright
offenses as they do other criminal offenses. These jurisdictions
traditionally have left sentencing judges with vast discretion to
impose what they consider to be appropriate sentences on a
case-by-case basis. More general principles or concepts which
guide judicial discretion are allowed to develop by slow accretion
through the common-law process. It is therefore remarkable
that one of the largest common-law countries in the world, the
United States, has broken so dramatically with that traditional
approach and has adopted a legislative and administrative re-
gime that significantly cabins the discretion of federal judges in
criminal sentencing.
Because copyright is the field of intellectual property law
where criminal enforcement looms largest, it may be instructive
to compare the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for copyright piracy
offenders with the sentencing practices of another jurisdiction
www.ifpi.org/site-content/press/20020228.html (six-month term of imprisonment for
importer of thousands of pirated CDs).
8. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Member of "DrinkOrDie" Warez Group
Sentenced to 41 Months," July 2, 2002, available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ob/Pat-
tanay.htm (41-month term of imprisonment for council member and "cracker" (i.e.,
specialist in stripping or circumventing software copyright protections) in international
software piracy ring).
9. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1,
pt. A, cmt. at 2 (2001).
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that, like the United States, not only has adopted but vigorously
enforces criminal copyright laws against pirates. The HKSAR of
the People's Republic of China ("PRC") may be especially suita-
ble for this kind of comparison. Like the United States, the HK-
SAR, even after its reversion to the PRC in 1997, has remained
strongly devoted to its common-law legal system.1 ° The HKSAR
has also demonstrated a strong commitment to criminal copy-
right enforcement, as part of its efforts to reduce what had been
called "one of the highest copyright piracy rates in the world."'"
Moreover, as this Article will show, HKSAR courts have devel-
oped a form of sentencing guidelines for copyright offenders
that can be usefully compared with the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines.
In comparing the guidelines of these two legal systems, this
Article explicitly seeks to avoid certain pitfalls of traditional com-
parative law scholarship. In the past, many comparatists have fa-
vored what Rudolf Schlesinger called "integrative comparison" -
that is, comparison of legal systems and institutions that prima-
rily emphasizes similarities rather than differences. t2 This devo-
tion to the primacy of comparison - which largely animates the
recent crusade by some comparatists to seek out the "common
core" of legal systems13 - can often lead scholars astray. In some
major legal systems, it must be said, law is "an unruly, disjointed
corpus" that has no common core. 4 In other legal systems, the
basic elements of the systems may have a common lineage, such
as the common law, but reflect significant divergences in the
structures and operations of those systems.
Other strains of comparative law scholarship do not necessa-
10. The Basic Law of the HKSAR, which was enacted by the PRC National People's
Congress, is "akin to a mini-constitution for the HKSAR." Hong Kong Dep't of Justice,
The Legal System of Hong Kong, at http://www.info.gov.hk/justice/new/legal/index.htm.
Under Article 8 of the Basic Law "[T] he laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is,
the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law
shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and subject to any amend-
ment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region." HKSAR Ba-
sic Law, Art. 8, available at, http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/index.htm.
11. Reuters, Hong Kong Firms Scramble to Comply with Software Piracy Laws, Mar. 29,
2001, available at http://www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/tech/079277.htm.
12. Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Past and Future of Comparative Law, 43 AM. J. COMP.
L. 477, 477 (1995).
13. See, e.g., id. at 479.
14. SeeJ. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAw: AN ECONOMIC AP-
PROACH xi (1999).
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rily favor similarity over difference in the comparative process.
They take into account the value of the comparative process, yet
move beyond the simplicity of rule-based comparison that has
dominated traditional comparative law scholarship. 5 In doing
so, they also can show that comparative law can serve ostensibly
different purposes. Comparative law scholarship can be con-
structive, showing how society can devise and operate legal insti-
tutions and mechanisms. It can also, as George P. Fletcher has
cogently observed, be subversive - facilitating law reform by
forcing a society to consider the aspects of its legal culture that
are resistant to change and whether those sources of resistance
make sense.16
In this case, it would be inappropriate to examine only the
superficial similarities between the two jurisdictions' sentencing
practices for copyright offenders. As this Article will show, there
are substantial differences not only in the types of guidelines
that both jurisdictions have devised, but also in the means by
which those guidelines have been developed. This Article will
therefore begin by summarizing the features of the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Guidelines that are most pertinent in sentencing criminal
copyright offenders. It will then examine the emergence ofjudi-
cially devised sentencing guidelines in the HKSAR. Finally, it
will identify the more significant points of similarity and contrast
between the two types of guidelines, and evaluate the extent to
which both types of guidelines achieve the fundamental goals of
honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing.
I. SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE UNITED STATES
In 1984, the United States Congress dramatically altered the
process and practices of sentencing in federal criminal prosecu-
tions by enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984."7 The Act
created the U.S. Sentencing Commission as an independent
commission in the judicial branch of the federal government.18
The Commission, which consists of seven voting and one nonvot-
15. SeeJOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE LONELINESS OF THE COMPARATIVE LAWYER 6-7
(1999).
16. See George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 Am. J.
COMP. L. 683, 696, 700 (1998).
17. Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, ch. II, Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1897 (codified, as
amended, at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3551 and 28 U.S.C. Secs. 524, 992-994, 1921).
18. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 991(a).
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ing member, has two principal purposes.19 First, the Commis-
sion is charged with establishing sentencing policies and prac-
tices for the federal criminal justice system that meet three
objectives:
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set
forth in section 3553(a) (2) of title 18, United States Code;
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes
of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted
by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in
the establishment of general sentencing practices; and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowl-
edge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice
process.
20
Second, the Commission is required to develop means of mea-
suring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correc-
tional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentenc-
ing, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a) (2).21
The most important function that the Commission per-
forms is the promulgation and distribution of Guidelines that
federal district courts are to use in determining the sentences to
be imposed in criminal cases. 22 The Commission also promul-
gates and distributes general policy statements for use by federal
courts regarding application of Sentencing Guidelines or any
other aspect of sentencing or sentencing implementation that
would further the purposes of sentencing.23 For each category
of offense, the Commission, among other tasks, establishes a sen-
tencing range (measured in numbers of months of incarceration
or other confinement such as home detention) that is consistent
with all pertinent provisions of Title 18 of the United States
Code.24
While the Commission can promulgate Guidelines that ad-
dress a wide variety of characteristics relating to the offense it-
19. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 991(a).
20. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 991 (b) (1).
21. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 991 (b) (2).
22. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(a)(1).
23. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(a) (2)-(3).
24. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(b) (1).
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self, the Sentencing Reform Act sharply limits the range of of-
fenders' personal characteristics that the Commission can factor
into Guidelines and policy statements. The Act adjures neutral-
ity in the Guidelines and policy statements "as to the race, sex,
national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders. '25
The Commission may take eleven other personal characteristics
into account only to the extent that those characteristics have
relevance to the nature, extent, place of service, or other inci-
dents of an appropriate sentence. 26 These eleven characteristics
are: (1) age; (2) education; (3) vocational skills; (4) mental and
emotional condition (to the extent that such condition mitigates
the defendant's culpability or to the extent that such condition
is otherwise plainly relevant); (5) physical condition, including
drug dependence; (6) previous employment record; (7) family
ties and responsibilities; (8) community ties; (9) role in the of-
fense; (10) criminal history; and (11) degree of dependence
upon criminal activity for a livelihood. 7 The Act further directs
the Commission to assure that, in recommending a term (or
length of term) of imprisonment, the Guidelines and policy
statements "reflect the general inappropriateness of considering
the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties
and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant. ''21
These directives reflect a general Congressional intent that
guideline sentences be based "on the characteristics of the of-
fense committed, not the character of the defendant.""9
The approach on which the Commission settled to develop
specific Guidelines for specific criminal offenses involves the cre-
ation of a Sentencing Table with two dimensions."0 One axis of
the table consists of 43 numbered offense levels, each of which
has a specific sentencing range (from zero to six months impris-
onment to life imprisonment). Each federal felony offense is as-
signed to a particular guideline to which the Commission has
assigned a numerical base offense level. The sentencing range
that a sentencing court may apply to an offense or conviction
25. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(d).
26. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(d).
27. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(d)(1)-(11).
28. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(e).
29. ROGER W. HAINES, JR., FRANK 0. BOWMAN, II, & JENNIFER C. WOLL, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 1241 (2001).
30. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra n.9, ch. 5, pt. A, at 335.
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will vary with the base offense level for that offense, as well as
additional factors (e.g., amounts of loss or gain or other offense
characteristics) that may increase or decrease the numerical
value of the offense level.
The other axis of the table consists of six categories of crimi-
nal history to which certain point values are assigned. Depend-
ing on the number and severity of criminal sentences previously
imposed on the defendant, the applicable Guidelines range will
vary with the criminal history category into which the defendant
fits. For example, if a defendant who had defrauded several vic-
tims of a total of U.S.$1 million pleaded guilty to mail fraud,31
the applicable guideline range could vary from twenty-seven to
thirty-three months imprisonment (if the defendant had no
prior criminal history) to as much as fifty-seven to seventy-one
months imprisonment (if the defendant has an extremely exten-
sive criminal history). 32
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a federal judge may de-
part either upward or downward from a final calculation of the
appropriate sentencing range. In the case of a downward depar-
ture with which the prosecutors disagree, the prosecutors may
appeal that downward departure; in the case of an upward de-
parture, the defendant may appeal the sentence.
The Sentencing Guidelines that pertain to criminal copy-
right offenses are wholly consistent with this general approach.
Guideline Section 2B5.3, to which the principal federal criminal
copyright offenses33 are assigned for sentencing purposes, has a
base offense level of 8." If the amount of the copyright infringe-
ment exceeds U.S.$2,000 but does not exceed U.S.$5,000, the
sentencing judge is to apply a one-level increase. If the infringe-
ment amount exceeds U.S.$5,000, the judge is to increase the
offense level in accordance with the number of levels in the loss
table used in the guideline applicable to theft and fraud offenses
(i.e., Guideline Section 2B1.1). 35 If the offense involved the
31. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341.
32. See U.S. SENTENCING CCMM'N, supra n.9, Secs. 2Bl.1, 3E1.1, and Sentencing
Table at 67, 307, 335 (base offense level 6, sixteen-level increase for $1 million loss, and
two-level decrease for clear acceptance of responsibility for his offense).
33. See 17 U.S.C. Sec. 506(a) and 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2318-20 and 2511.
34. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra n.9, Sec. 2B5.3(a) at 96.
35. Id. Sec. 2B5.3(b)(1) at 96-97. This particular Guideline exemplifies the Com-
mission's view that Section 2B3.5 "treats copyright and trademark violations much like
theft and fraud. Similar to the sentences for theft and fraud offenses, the sentences for
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manufacture, importation, or uploading of infringing items, the
judge is to apply an additional two-level increase; if the resulting
offense level is less than 12, the judge is to increase the level to
12.36 If the offense was not committed for commercial advan-
tage or private financial gain, the judge is to apply a two-level
decrease (but may not decrease the resulting offense level below
level 8) .3' Finally, if the offense involved either the conscious or
reckless risk of serious bodily injury or possession of a dangerous
weapon (including a firearm) in connection with the offense,
the judge is to apply a two-level increase; if the resulting offense
level is less than 13, the judge is to increase it to level U."
The judge must also take into consideration other factors
relating to the copyright defendant's role in the offense. If the
defendant played a supervisory, managing, or leading role in the
offense, the judge is to apply an increase of two to four levels
depending on the extent of that role.3 9 On the other hand, the
judge is to decrease the offense level by two levels if the defen-
dant was a minor participant in any criminal activity; by four
levels if the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal
activity; and by three levels in cases falling between the "minor"
and "minimal" participant categories.40
Consistent with the admonitions of the Sentencing Reform
Act, the Sentencing Guidelines specify that numerous offender
characteristics are not ordinarily relevant in determining
whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline
range, such as age (including youth);4 education and vocational
defendants convicted of intellectual property offenses should reflect the nature and
magnitude of the pecuniary harm caused by their crimes." Id. Sec. 2B3.5 Background
at 99.
36. Id. Sec. 2B5.3(b) (2) at 97.
37. Id. Sec. 2B5.3(b) (3) at 97.
38. Id.
39. See id. Sec. 3B1.1 at 284. If the defendant was an organizer or a leader of a
criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, the
increase is four levels. If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an orga-
nizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was oth-
erwise extensive, the increase is three levels. If the defendant was an organizer, leader,
manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than those described in the pre-
ceding two sentences, the increase is two levels. Id.
40. Id. Sec. 3B1.2. at 285. The Commission's Application Notes for this Section
make plain that any of these decreases should be applied only if the defendant plays a
part in committing the offense "that makes him substantially less culpable than the
average participant." Id. Application Note 3(A) at 286.
41. Id. Sec. 5H1.1. at 377.
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skills;4 2 mental and emotional conditions;4 " physical condition
or appearance (including physique);44 employment record;45
family ties and responsibilities and community ties;46 and mili-
tary, civic, charitable, or public service, employment-related con-
tributions, or similar prior good works. 47 Other offender charac-
teristics, such as lack of guidance as a youth or similar circum-
stances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing, are uniformly
deemed to be "never relevant grounds for imposing a sentence
outside the applicable guideline range. '48 Race, sex, national or-
igin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status are deemed
"never relevant in the determination of a sentence." 4 9
In view of the Sentencing Guidelines' high degree of speci-
ficity, it should not be surprising that there are only two pub-
lished judicial decisions to date that construe any of the provi-
sions of Guidelines Section 2B3.5. These decisions have focused
only on the computation of the retail value of infringing items.
5 °
II. SENIENCING GUIDELINES IN THE HKSAR
In contrast to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines process,
where the Sentencing Commission plays the decisive role, the
wellspring of sentencing guidelines in the HKSAR is the Hong
Kong Court of Appeal. In formal terms, the Court of Appeal is
the penultimate appellate court in the HKSAR. Usually operat-
ing in three three-judge divisions, it hears appeals from the
Court of First Instance,"1 the District Court,52 and other tribu-
42. Id. Sec. 5H1.2. at 378.
43. Id. Sec. 5H1.3. at 378.
44. Id. Sec. 5H1.4. at 378.
45. Id. Sec. 5HI.5. at 379.
46. Id. Sec. 5H1.6. at 379.
47. Id. Sec. 5Hl l. at 380.
48. Id. Sec. 5H1.12 at 380.
49. Id. Sec. 5H1.10 at 380.
50. See United States v. Cho, 136 F.3d 982, 984 (5th Cir. 1998) (retail value of
counterfeit items, rather than loss resulting from defendant's trademark infringement,
determined sentencing enhancement under Sec. 2B5.3); United States v. Larracuente,
952 F.2d 672, 674 (2d Cir. 1992) (retail value of tapes copied by criminal copyright
infringement defendant, rather than price at which defendant sold the tapes, was ap-
propriate value to use for calculating "retail value" of infringing items under Sec.
2B5.3).
51. The Court of First Instance (formerly the High Court ofJustice) has ajurisdic-
tion that is mostly original, although it hears appeals from Magistrates' Courts and
some tribunals. In criminal matters of first instance, the Court of First Instance deals
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nals. In practice, the Court of Appeal is effectively "the final ar-
biter of what Hong Kong law is," 53 including the law of criminal
sentencing.
Long before the transfer of Hong Kong's sovereignty to
China, the Court of Appeal had established a tradition of occa-
sionally issuing guidelines for sentencing of certain offenses.
These guidelines were designed to assist sentencing judges in
the application of judicial discretion "and to produce a degree
of consistency in sentencing."5 A sentencing judge who did not
disagree with particular guidelines, but who felt that a departure
therefrom was warranted in an individual case, could do so if he
or she made clear that the court appreciated "the correct scale
of sentence" and indicated why it was felt proper to depart.55
On the other hand, a sentencing judge who disagreed with par-
ticular guidelines, or who felt that the guidelines had been su-
perseded by other events, was still required to follow them. If
the Court noted why it felt that the guidelines required revision,
the Attorney General of Hong Kong could consider inviting the
Court of Appeal to make the revision.56
Thanks in part to the provisions of Article 8 of the Basic
Law, this tradition has carried over to the sentencing process in
the HKSAR. The Court of Appeal continues to issue guidelines,
though it exercises its authority sparingly.57 In addition, the
with serious crimes involving only indictable offenses. PEITER WESLEY-SMITH, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE HONG KONG LEGAL SYSTEM 69 (3d ed. 1998).
52. Id. at 68-69. The District Court, which occupies a place between the Magis-
trates' Courts and the Court of First Instance, is a court of fairly limited civil, equitable,
and criminal jurisdiction. Its criminal jurisdiction extends only to "charges relating to
indictable offences which have been transferred from magistrates on application by the
Secretary ofJustice." Id. at 68. District Court judges hear cases without ajury and can
sentence convicted offenders to terms of not more than seven years imprisonment. Se-
rious offenses such as murder and genocide may be tried only in the Court of First
Instance. Id. at 68-69.
53. Id. at 70.
54. Id. See also GRENVILLE CROSS & PATRICK W.S. CHEUNG, SENTENCING IN HONG
KONG 61 (1994) (citing R. v. Ng Fung-king, [1993] 2 HKCLR 219, 221 and R. v. New-
some and Bourne, (1970) 54 Cr. App. R. 485, 490).
55. Id. (citing R. v. Yau Koon-yau, AR 12/84, and Att'y Gen. v. Lam Ping-chun, AR
10/88).
56. Id. at 61-62 (citing R. v. Yeung Kwok-leung and Another, Cr. App. 377/93).
57. Compare, e.g., HKSAR v. Lee Tak-kwan, [1998] HKCA 204 (setting guidelines
for trafficking in the drug "ecstasy") with Secretary forJustice v. Lam Chi Wah, [1999]
HKCA 505 (declining to set any guideline for offenses under Trade Descriptions Ordi-
nance, chap. 362), available at http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/ord/tdo256/) and HK-
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Court of Appeal has standardized for all types of criminal of-
fenses a one-third reduction of sentence where the defendant
pleads guilty.58
A. Secretary for Justice v. Choi Sai Lok
In tracing the development of guidelines for criminal copy-
right offenses, the proper point of departure is the Hong Kong
Court of Appeal's decision in Secretary for Justice v. Choi Sai Lok.59
This prosecution, which involved possession of infringing copies
of copyrighted works, arose under section 118(1) (d) of the Cop-
yright Ordinance.6 ° The two defendants were observed carrying
three cartons that proved to hold more than 1,200 infringing
video compact disks ("CDs") and 100 infringing music CDs.
Both defendants eventually admitted to delivering CDs, which
they knew were pirated, for another man at a rate of HK $350
per day. One defendant also admitted to packing the CDs
before he delivered them, and had been entrusted by his supe-
rior with keys to a nearby storeroom, where police found nearly
23,000 more infringing CDs. 1 After both defendants pleaded
guilty in the District Court to section 118(1) (d) charges, the Dis-
trict Court sentenced them to suspended terms of imprison-
ment.6 2 The Secretary of Justice then applied for a review of the
sentences, with leave to do so from the Chief Judge of the High
Court.
6 3
The Court of Appeal began by restating what it termed the
District Court judge's "clear and concise explanation of his rea-
sons for sentence."64 The District Court had stated, in pertinent
part, that so far as it was aware:
[t]he Court of Appeal still feels that at this stage no guide-
SAR v. Tam Hei Lun, [2000] 3 HKCA 745 (declining to set guidelines with respect to
computer-related offenses, specifically section 161 of the Crimes Ordinance).
58. See, e.g., HKSAR v. Li Yan, [1998] HKCA 346.
59. [1999] HKCA 386, available at http://www.hklii.org.
60. Chap. 528, available at http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/ord/co186/.
6 1. See Choi Sai Lok, [1999] FHKCA, at 386.
62. Id. The court sentenced the first defendant, Choi Sai Lok, to eighteen months
imprisonment (suspended for two years) and the payment of HK $5,000 towards prose-
cution costs. It sentenced the second defendant, Mak Wai Hon, to eighteen months
imprisonment on one charge and two years imprisonment on a second charge (both
suspended for two years) and the payment of HK $8,000 towards prosecution costs. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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lines for sentences need be laid down because the circum-
stances of offences and offenders obviously vary widely. That
said, the seriousness with which these offences are now
viewed would clearly make some form of custodial sentence
the norm rather than the exception when persons are con-
victed of being involved in this illegal enterprise, although
each case has to be considered on its merits; that is, bearing
in mind its particular facts and the circumstances of the indi-
vidual offenders.
65
The Court of Appeal said that it "entirely agree[d]" with that
statement, but emphasized that "custodial sentences of immedi-
ate effect should be imposed for offences of this kind unless the
circumstances can truly be said to be exceptional. '" 6 Curiously,
the Court made no mention, then or later in the decision, of its
prior statement in Regina v. Li Wan Kei67 concerning guidelines
for copyright offenses. In Li Wan Kei, decided less than twenty-
eight months before Choi Sai Lok, the Court of Appeal had de-
clined the defendant's invitation to lay down such guidelines,
stating not only that it was "not prepared" to do so but that
[... ] it would be inappropriate - certainly at this stage. The
circumstances of offences and offenders obviously vary
widely. Judges in the District Court for the more serious of-
fences will build up their experience dealing with these mat-
ters. They will take account of their experience to pass appro-
priate sentences.6
8
The Court in Choi Sai Lok then reviewed another statement
by the District Court, in which the sentencing judge had sought
to distinguish away a number of copyright piracy cases cited to
him. In particular, the judge had noted that "[n]ot only do the
numbers of pirated copies understandably differ from the pre-
sent case, but more to the point the status of the particular de-
fendants were [sic] different, being either owners or salesmen,
whereas these two defendants were transporters of the goods
rather than distributors."6 The Court of Appeal responded that
it had no doubt about distinguishing the proprietors of retail
outlets and warehouses who committed copyright piracy from
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. [1997] HKCA 244.
68. Id.
69. Choi Sai Lok, [1999] HKCA, at 386.
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their employees, or about imposing longer sentences on the pro-
prietors. It disagreed, however, with the District Court's distinc-
tion between
[s]alesmen on the one hand and couriers on the other. The
roles played by storemen, packers, delivery men and salesmen
may be different, but we do not see much difference between
them in terms of criminal culpability. What will justify differ-
ences in sentences between them will be, for example, the
number of infringing copies involved, the length of time in
which they had been engaged in the trade and factors per-
sonal to them such as pleas of guilty.70
In arriving at the sentences, the District Court had consid-
ered the personal circumstances of the defendants - both "fam-
ily men in their early forties of hitherto good character," who
had recently become unemployed after regular employment
throughout their working lives and who had admitted what they
had done when they were arrested - and what it termed the
defendants' status as "transportation workers" rather than "own-
ers" or "salesmen." It therefore had taken eighteen months im-
prisonment as the starting point for calculating the first defen-
dant's sentence, and concurrent terms of eighteen months and
two years imprisonment for the second defendant's sentence,
before suspending their sentences.7' In addition, in making
these calculations, the District Court did not offer the standard
one-third reduction of the starting points to reflect the plea of
guilty.
72
The Court of Appeal emphatically replied that "an assertion
by a defendant that he is a mere employee in the business will
not warrant the suspension of an otherwise appropriate sentence
of imprisonment. '73 To buttress this point, it quoted from a de-
cision by the Court of First Instance, Regina v. Ng Wai Ching.7 1 In
that case, the Court of First Instance had reviewed the appeals
against detention sentences for copyright-related offenses by two
defendants. Although both defendants were apparently





74. Regina v. Ching, [1996] HCMA, at 1309 (Sup. Ct. of Hong Kong, Dec. 11,
1996), quoting [1996] HKCFI 632.
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prior criminal record, and had pleaded guilty, the Court of First
Instance dismissed both appeals. Noting the frequency with
which such salesmen were apprehended and pleaded guilty, it
expressed regret that the Hong Kong Customs and Excise De-
partment, which is responsible for investigating copyright viola-
tions, apparently could not "catch the big fish of the trade and
can only bring the minnows before the courts. '7 5 This latter
point prompted the Court of First Instance to devise a syllogism
favoring the defendant's detention: (1) salesmen, because they
are essential to the success of copyright piracy operators, must
be deterred (major premise); (2) fines (in the experience of the
courts) do not deter salesmen (minor premise); (3) therefore
courts must impose custodial sentences on salesmen, notwith-
standing their personal characteristics.76
The Court of Appeal, with an implicit nod of approval for
this reasoning, added that this "is a clear echo of the thinking
behind the sentencing, for example, of couriers in the narcotics
trade. 77 It concluded that the sentencing judge was "wrong in
principle" in suspending the sentences, specifically citing the
lack of any exceptional circumstances that would have justified
suspension. It then adjusted downward the starting points for
the defendants' sentences to twelve and eighteen months, re-
spectively;78 further reduced the sentences by one-third for their
guilty pleas; and included a further discount of one-quarter
since the defendants' application for review of sentence would
result in their "having to serve sentences of imprisonment which
they would not otherwise have had to serve [ . ].].' This re-
sulted in the Court of Appeal's setting aside the sentences im-
posed below and substituting therefore a six-month term of im-
prisonment for the first defendant, and six- and nine-month
terms of imprisonment (to be served concurrently) for the sec-




77. Choi Sai Lok, [1999] HKCA, at 386.
78. The Court of Appeal's explanation for doing so was that it thought the sen-
tencingjudge would have adopted "slightly lower starting points" had it been imposing
sentences of imprisonment with immediate effect. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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The Court of Appeal also took pains to emphasize the ap-
propriateness of including a sentence reduction in copyright
piracy cases such as the one before it, where the defendant was
willing to plead guilty at the outset of the prosecution. It com-
mented that "[tihe preparation of a case of this kind for trial
involves considerable efforts in locating the copyright owners of
the infringing copies, and obtaining confirmations from them
that they are indeed the copyright owners and that the copies
seized were not produced under license."'" It then quoted ap-
provingly its prior decision in Li Wan Kei,82 which had stated that
"[i] t may be that [... ] if there is a full indication of an intention
to plead guilty at the very outset which avoids all the elaborate
preparation and expense for trial, this also will be reflected in
the sentence passed."8"
B. Secretary for Justice v. Wong Dak Sun
At the outset, Choi Sai Lok appeared to have provided signifi-
cant guidance to lower courts on sentencing defendants in-
volved in copyright piracy. Soon after the Court of Appeal's de-
cision, several decisions by the Court of First Instance explicitly
relied on it in dismissing appeals against sentences of copyright
defendants.8 4 Yet within the year, the Court of Appeal found it
necessary to reiterate and to extend the principles that it had
laid down in Choi Sai Lok.
In Secretary for Justice v. Wong Dak Sun,85 the Court of Appeal
reviewed a decision by the District Court to suspend sentences,
under various provisions of Section 188 of the Copyright Ordi-
nance, against three defendants. Unlike the defendants in Choi
Sai Lok, these three defendants were not low-level salesmen, but
81. Id.
82. [1997] HKCA, at 244.
83. Id.
84. See HKSAR v. Li Tim Fai, [2000] HKCFI 283 (finding the twelve-month sen-
tence under section 118(1)(e)(ii) of Copyright Ordinance to be neither wrong in prin-
ciple nor manifestly excessive); see also, HKSAR v. Chan Yau Ming, [2000] HKCFI 217
(finding starting point of nine months, under sections 118(1) (e) (ii) and 119(1) of Cop-
yright Ordinance and sections 9(2) and 18(1) of Trade Descriptions Ordinance to be
neither wrong in principle not manifestly excessive, but allowing reduction due to de-
fendant's medical condition); see also, HKSAR v. Williams George Edward, [2000]
HKCFI 181 (finding sentence under sections 118(1)(d) and 119(1) of Copyright Ordi-
nance not to be manifestly excessive).
85. [2000] HKCA 332, available at http://www.hklii.org.
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were directly involved in the production of large quantities of
infringing CDs.8 6 One was a director and shareholder of the
company producing the infringing CDs, another was the com-
pany's general manager, and the third was a manager who
played a "hands-on" role in production.87
At the time of its decision, the District Court was well aware
of Choi Sai Lok; indeed, it cited Choi Sai Lok in its reasons for
decision.88 Yet those reasons for decision sharply diverged from
the principles set forth in Choi Sai Lok. In Wong Dak Sun, there
had been a delay of more than two years between the Commis-
sion of the Copyright Offenses and the District Court's sentence.
This delay stemmed directly from the defendants' decision to
contest the case and take it to trial, which required the prosecu-
tors to gather and prepare proof of the infringing nature of the
many CDs found on the company's premises.8 9 The District
Court nonetheless held the prosecution solely responsible for
the delay.
The District Court also cited three other major factors
weighing in favor of leniency. First, it characterized the business
that the defendants had carried on through the company as be-
ing "in other respects a legitimate and insubstantial one," and
the incidence of infringing disks as "relatively tiny."'' Second, it
noted that the company, having had its production lines re-
turned to it after seizure by Customs and Excise, had continued
to manufacture CDs without further infringement. Third, it
speculated that two of the individual defendants did not receive
any direct financial benefit from the production of the infring-
ing copies.9' Accordingly, it imposed what might have been sig-
nificant sentences of imprisonment (i.e. thirty, eighteen, and
twenty-four months, respectively), but stated that "[i]n the cir-
cumstances I am prepared to accept, perhaps over-generously, that
there is justification for suspending the terms of imprisonment
86. When Customs and Excise officers raided the premises of the company with
which the three defendants were connected, they found more than 42,000 infringing
CDs involving fifty different titles of infringed works, as well as three CD production
lines, twenty-three "stampers" (i.e., master copies of infringed works), thirty-nince silk-
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without offending the principles laid down by the Court of Ap-
peal and without in any way detracting from the seriousness of
the offences."
9 2
The Court of Appeal's response to this statement was imme-
diate and unusually pointed:
It seems to this court that the judge had not exaggerated the
position when he stated himself as having been over-gener-
ous. These were very serious offences, which had been hotly
contested over a large number of days in the District Court.
The offenders were not small-time salesmen of pirated discs
such as the magistrates courts see day in and day out. Such
offenders are often sentenced to serve immediate terms in
custody, whether or not they have good character, and re-
gardless of their age. Furthermore, they were being sent to
prison in 1997 when these offences were committed for pre-
cisely the reasons [... 1 given in Ng Wai Ching.
These defendants were not small-time offenders. They were
engaged in the production of infringing discs. If they are not
to be sent to prison immediately, it offends every principle of
fairness and justice that small-time offenders are to be imme-
diately incarcerated.9"
The Court also strongly reiterated the principle, which "[t]he
courts have over and over again stated in recent times," that sus-
pended sentences should not be imposed absent "unusual or ex-
ceptional circumstances which can justify a departure from an
immediate prison sentence. 9 4
The Court of Appeal also rejected the other factors that the
District Court felt warranted suspension on the sentences. It
held the defendants solely responsible for the delay (while not-
ing that they were fully entitled to put the prosecution to its
proof). It also stated, in scarcely less severe terms, that
[w] hile the judge paid heed to the differing roles of the de-
fendants, he does seem, with the greatest respect, to have lost
sight of the fact that all of them had responsible positions in
the company [ ... ]. This oversight on the part of the judge
may perhaps have been because he fell into the trap of com-
paring the relatively small quantity of infringing copies (al-
beit relating to fifty different titles) against the much larger
92. Id. (emphasis supplied).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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quantity of legitimate discs.
95
Finally, it identified as a "very important point of principle in
sentencing [ ...], which has to be borne in mind in cases of this
nature," that courts need to avoid the disparity between immedi-
ately imprisoning small-time retail salesmen and refraining from
imposing such sentences on "relatively well-to-do defendants,"
such as managers and bosses.9 6
In recalculating the sentences, the Court of Appeal contin-
ued to rebuke the District Court. It commented that the
sentences which the District Court had imposed prior to suspen-
sion "in themselves were by any standards low, even for offences
committed in 1997 [ . .]."97 It further noted that the sentence
for the company director and shareholder, who had initially re-
ceived the thirty-month sentence, "in itself [... ] was a lenient
sentence for a man in [his] position who had been found guilty
of these offences and, in particular, having been convicted on
charge 8 [involving the possession of the equipment to make
infringing copies]."98 At the same time, it reduced the District
Court's starting points by approximately one-quarter, in recogni-
tion of the fact that the defendants would now have to serve
terms of imprisonment that were previously suspended.' This
resulted in sentences for the three defendants that totaled
twenty-two, thirteen, and eighteen months, respectively. To un-
derscore its dissatisfaction with the District Court's handling of
the sentencing, the Court added a final admonition that
[t]hese sentences, for offences of this gravity, should not be
regarded for the future as providing any kind of guideline.
Plainly, in the light of what we have already said, sentences
higher than the starting points adopted by the judge for of-
fences of this nature would be upheld by this court. °
Since the Court of Appeal's decision in Wong Dak Sung, several
reported decisions by the Court of First Instance have cited only
Choi Sai Lok in reviewing sentences under the Copyright Ordi-
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for lower courts that the Court of Appeal will not countenance
any double standard in sentencing of copyright piracy offenders,
and that any suspension of sentence in such cases is likely to be
scrutinized with extreme care.
III. EVALUATION
In a recent decision involving a Copyright Ordinance sen-
tence, the Court of First Instance declared that Choi Sai Lok "did
not set new sentencing guidelines," but "merely grouped to-
gether principles which had been followed by courts for some
time. '  In its opinion, the relevant sentencing guidelines at
the time the Magistrate had sentenced the defendant (i.e., ap-
proximately six weeks before the decision in Choi Sai Lok) "were
in cases that preceded Choi Sai Lok [...]."l°0
Whatever their value in supporting the Court of First In-
stance's decision in that case,1 °4 these assertions are rebutted, as
we have seen, by the Court of Appeal's own words in both Li
Wan Kei and Choi Sai Lok. In effect, if not in literal terms, the
decisions in Choi Sai Lok and Wong Dak Sun have established a
group of sentencing guidelines that the Court of Appeal plainly
intends lower courts to follow in copyright piracy sentencing.
These guidelines may be summarized as follows:
1. In all cases, immediate imprisonment or detention should be
imposed on defendants, without reference to their relative posi-
tion in a particular copyright piracy operation, absent truly ex-
traordinary circumstances. Age and general "good character"
should not affect this determination.
imprisonment sentence under section 118(1) (d) of Copyright Ordinance of person in
charge of warehouse storing infringing discs to be neither excessive nor wrong in prin-
ciple); HKSAR v. Wong Ho Fai, [2001] HKCFI 268 (finding six- to-nine month Deten-
tion Center sentence under sections 118(1) (e) (ii) and 119(1) of Copyright Ordinance
of person who possessed more than 1,000 pirated discs to be neither manifestly exces-
sive nor wrong in principle); HKSAR v. Wong Yiu Ming, [2001] HKCFI 238 (reducing
sentence, under section 118(1) (e) (ii) of Copyright Ordinance, of retail seller of in-
fringing discs from ten to eight months imprisonment, based on setting of initial start-
ing point of eighteen months without reference to number of infringing discs).
102. WongHo Fai, [2001] HKCFI, at 268.
103. Id.
104. In that case, counsel for the defendant essentially had argued, in seeking a
more lenient sentence, that Choi Sai Lok had changed sentencing practices that had
previously applied to copyright offenses. See id. The Court of First Instance's view that
Choi Sai Lok changed nothing, and merely restated sentencing principles previously in
force, would certainly have served to rebut that position.
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2. Defendants who occupy supervisory positions in organizations
that produce pirated CDs should not, at a minimum, be treated
more leniently than lower-level non-supervisory personnel in
such organizations.
3. The number of pirated copies in the defendant's possession
or control should be considered, without reference to the num-
ber of non-infringing copies that may also be in his possession or
control.
4. Defendants who plead guilty promptly after being charged
should receive a one-third discount from whatever starting point
the sentencing judge selects.
The question remains how well these HKSAR guidelines,
and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, achieve the goals of hon-
esty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing. Both appear
to achieve reasonable honesty in sentencing, as neither legal sys-
tem allows for substantial reductions in time served after imposi-
tion of sentence. Uniformity and proportionality are more diffi-
cult to assess, as the balance between the two concepts is inevita-
bly difficult to strike in any legal system.
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines may have an advantage in
that they clearly articulate and quantify more factors that a sen-
tencing judge must explicitly consider beyond the base offense
level. The amount of the copyright infringement (rather than
just the number of infringing items); involvement in manufac-
ture, importation, or uploading of infringing items; commission
of the offense for commercial advantage or private financial
gain; risk of serious bodily injury or possession of a dangerous
weapon in connection with the offense; the defendant's role in
the offense (whether minimal, minor, or supervisory); and the
defendant's criminal history - all affect the ultimate sentencing
calculations. On the other hand, age and personal circum-
stances ordinarily are not relevant in determining whether to go
outside the applicable guideline range (although a court might
cite such factors in selecting a specific sentence within a given
range). Taken together, these Guidelines appear more than ad-
equate to ensure that similarly situated piracy defendants are
treated similarly, and that persons with greater authority and su-
pervisory duties in pirate operations will be sentenced more se-
verely than their underlings.
In contrast, the HKSAR guidelines to date address only
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some of these factors with any specificity. The defendant's role
in the offense and the number of infringing items (but not their
"street value," or even their comparable retail value if they were
non-infringing items) must now be taken into account, while age
alone apparently should not. The Court of Appeal clearly is con-
cerned that sentencing judges avoid obvious disparity in impos-
ing terms of imprisonment. But it has yet to address whether it
will consider the nature of the defendant's involvement in man-
ufacture (as distinct from whether he plays a supervisory or non-
supervisory role), or the significance of commercial advantage
or private financial gain as a purpose of the defendant's actions.
Since the Court of Appeal's guidelines have only recently
been issued, and courts ordinarily must wait for particular cases
to come before them to consider the suitability of additional
guidelines, it would be premature to draw firm conclusions
about the adequacy or inadequacy of the current guidelines in
achieving reasonable uniformity and proportionality. It is not
too soon, however, to suggest that the Court of Appeal should
consider accelerating the process of devising additional guide-
lines for copyright piracy cases.
Based on the decisions discussed above, it does not appear
- contrary to the Court of Appeal's views in Li Wan Kei' °5 - that
the circumstances of offenders and offenses in piracy cases vary
that widely. The number of ways in which criminals can and do
efficiently set up and operate production lines and distribute
and sell infringing items is highly limited. If, despite the vigor-
ous enforcement efforts of HKSAR authorities, the lower courts
have not amassed enough information about piracy operations
for the Court of Appeal's use, it may be appropriate for the HK-
SAR courts or other authorities to commission a special report,
drawing on law enforcement and private-sector information, that
would provide a detailed description and analysis of such opera-
tions and the participants therein. The Court of Appeal could
then draw on that report, in addition to the continuing stream
of appeals against sentences, to devise a more comprehensive set
of guidelines.
105. See [1997] HKCA, at 244.
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CONCLUSION
One measure of the effectiveness of any sentencing regime
is whether it is changing criminal behavior in a way that is both
measurable and desirable. By that standard, the HKSAR's en-
forcement efforts against copyright piracy, including prosecu-
tion and sentencing, appears to have been highly effective at the
retail level. In November 2001, one reporter observed that "pi-
rate video stalls are sometimes left unmanned - and rely on
shoppers' honesty to put money into a shoe box at the door." ' 6
Nonetheless, copyright piracy continues to plague both the
United States and the HKSAR.1 °7 Authorities in both jurisdic-
tions therefore need to maintain vigorous criminal enforcement
and to seek sentences that strike an appropriate balance be-
tween uniformity and proportionality.
The U.S. copyright piracy Guidelines already appear to have
articulated and incorporated enough factors to make that bal-
ance achievable. The HKSAR's guidelines, still in the fledgling
state, are capable of achieving a similar balance. Whether they
can do so in timely fashion depends largely on how quickly HK-
SAR courts respond to the problem. While other aspects of HK-
SAR copyright law have attracted greater attention from
academia and the public,"1 8 further refinement of the current
guidelines may be no less important in increasing the effective-
ness of HKSAR copyright laws.
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